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CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
AFTER GRUTTER: GETTING REAL ABOUT THE 
"FOUR FREEDOMS" OF A UNIVERSITY 
J. PETER BYRNE* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v. Bollinger1 represents a 
high-water mark for the recognition and influence of constitutional aca-
demic freedom. The Court there relied, gingerly perhaps, on constitu-
tional academic freedom, understood as some autonomy for university 
decision making on matters of core academic concern, to provide a com-
pelling interest adequate to uphold flexible racial preferences in univer-
sity admissions. Now that the dust has settled from direct import of the 
decision for affirmative action in admissions,2 it is important to consider 
what role constitutional academic freedom, as a working constitutional 
doctrine, should or may play within current disputes about higher educa-
tion. 
In this essay, I hope to clarify the scope and strength of the right af-
firmed in Grutter and to suggest how it might apply to a few current and 
notorious disputes. Preliminarily, I provide some context for Grutter by 
reviewing the long development of constitutional academic freedom and 
the role it played in the Court's decision. The core ofthe paper examines 
three aspects of constitutional academic freedom by looking both at what 
Grutter tells us about each and how each addresses current controversies 
about the nature and scope of academic freedom. First, I argue that 
Grutter clarifies that constitutional academic freedom is a right and apply 
it to state referenda prohibiting universities from considering race in ad-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Neal 
Katyal, Robert Post, David Rabban, and Mike Seidman, for helpful comments, many of them 
critical, as well as the participants in the Rothgerber Conference at the University of Colorado 
School of Law. 
1. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
2. See Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 662-63 (2005) 
(collecting scholarly reactions to Grutter). Professor Horwitz observes that most commenta-
tors have neglected discussion of the academic freedom aspects of the case and proceeded un-
der the assumption that Grutter "belong[s] to the Fourteenth Amendment, subgenus affirma-
tive action." [d. at 463. 
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missions. Second, I consider the centrality to constitutional academic 
freedom of faculty control over the evaluation of scholarship and curricu-
lum, arguing that statutes enacting the so-called "Academic Bill of 
Rights" would be invalid. Third, I claim that the sphere of autonomy 
protected by the right must be limited to core academic areas and that 
broader claims to autonomy based on academic freedom, such as those 
advanced in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 
Inc. 3 for employer recruitment policies, both lack merit and may imperil 
the basic right. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM BEFORE GRUTTER 
Constitutional academic freedom exists to protect scholarship and 
teaching in higher education from untoward political interference, pri-
marily by granting universities autonomy over certain core scholarly and 
educational policies.4 While a First Amendment right, it embodies the 
academic values and systems of professional speech within higher educa-
tion rather than the rights of expression elaborated by the Court for citi-
zens generally against the broad sweep of government power. Thus, it 
protects indigenous academic speech values, to which the justifications 
for its applications should be traced, rather than the more familiar civic 
values of free speech relied on generally by courts in applying the First 
Amendment and elaborated by First Amendment scholars.5 While the 
justifications for a special constitutional protection of academic speech 
are complex, university scholarship and teaching uniquely advance the 
search for truth and model a fruitful discourse based on freedom, rigor, 
and accountability.6 This is not to say that academic free speech and 
civic free speech do not overlap. Plainly they do, both in individual 
cases and in the reasons employed to justify restraints on political power. 
However, nothing has confused understanding of constitutional academic 
freedom as much as misguided attempts to derive its content from gen-
eral First Amendment principles. 
3. 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006). 
4. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 
YALE L.J. 251 (1989). 
5. Analogously, Robert Post argues that academic freedom protects the professor only in 
her professional role::, and for functional reasons related to the production of knowledge, rather 
than as an individual citizen. Robert Post, The Strncture of Academic Freedom, in ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM AFTER SEPTEMBER II, 61, 72-73 (Barbara Doumani ed., 2006). I view this as 
complementary to the views expressed here. 
6. See J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to Constitutional Academic Freedom, 31 J.C. & V.L. 
79, 138-89 (2004). 
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Academic freedom developed before modern First Amendment ju-
risprudence.7 It was created neither by courts nor by legislatures. As a 
system of practices and values, academic freedom developed under the 
aegis of the American Association of University Professors during the 
early years of the twentieth century. Designed to insulate scholars from 
the political and religious prejudices of powerful lay trustees, it accom-
modated competing needs for intellectual freedom and disciplinary ac-
countability through peer review and tenure, which both sanctioned care-
ful evaluation by peers and sharply limited it by others. The core ethical 
concept was that a scholar could research, teach, and publish without re-
taliation for the political tendencies of her work. Peers should evaluate 
work only for its professional quality and, after tenure, professors could 
be dismissed only for cause such as moral turpitude demonstrated in a 
hearing. These were the conditions thought necessary for scholarship in 
the modern sense to be possible. While subject to numerous qualifica-
tions and failings in practice, the system of academic freedom had by 
mid-century settled basic issues of authority over scholarship and teach-
ing in research universities, and this ethic has since spread to nearly all 
institutions of higher education, including most religiously affiliated 
schools.8 This was the first national restraint on employers penalizing 
employees for their speech.9 Law played a minor role in its functioning. 
Professors might be able to enforce academic or tenure rights as a matter 
of contract, but the chief deterrent against violation was scandal and pro-
fessional censure. 10 
These informal arrangements shook when political actors grew 
more interested in expanding higher education after World War II. The 
Supreme Court fashioned constitutional academic freedom primarily to 
protect academic and intellectual work, seen as having prime First 
7. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES (1955) (giving the classic account of the origins 
of academic freedom). The most important document is the Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 
1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, reprinted in AM. ASS'N OF 
UNIV. PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REpORTS (9th ed. 2001) [hereinafter AAUP 
1915 Statement]. See also Byrne, supra note 4, at 269-79. 
8. Nearly all subscribe to the Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 1940 Statement of Princi-
ples on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, POLICY 
DOCUMENTS AND REpORTS (9th ed. 2001). See generally Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 State-
ment of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1990). 
9. The Supreme Court eventually fashioned qualified protection for speech by public 
employees. See. e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994); Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 
U.S. 563 (1968). 
10. AAUP maintains a "censure list" of institutions found to have seriously violated aca-
demic freedom. This reflects the long-held view that institutions that deny their members aca-
demic freedom are not truly universities and should "not be permitted to sail under false col-
ors." AAUP 1915 Statement, supra note 7. 
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Amendment importance, from untoward outside political interference. I I 
The first Supreme Court case to discuss academic freedom, Sweezy v. 
New Hampshire,12 reflected the pressures placed on universities during 
the McCarthy period. The Court prohibited the state attorney general's 
questioning of a lecturer at a state university about the political content 
of his presentation. Although the decision rejected the questioning on 
narrow and odd grounds, the Court expressed vigorously the values it 
saw at stake: 
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universi-
ties is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role 
in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. 
To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our col-
leges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No 
field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new 
discoveries cannot be made. Particularly is that true in the social sci-
ences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes. Schol-
arship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. 
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study, 
and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise 
our civilization will stagnate and die. 13 
In a concurring opinion, which set the peculiar pattern in which 
constitutional academic freedom has been given its most comprehensive 
and probing expression in concurring opinions,14 Justice Frankfurter 
urged an explicitly institutional right that amounted to "the exclusion of 
governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university."15 
Frankfurter drew neither on the internal system of academic freedom nor 
on any collateral legal doctrines. 16 He based his arguments on non-legal 
educational pronouncements, most importantly a statement of South Af-
rican scholars invoking the "'four essential freedoms' of a university-to 
determine itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be 
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."17 The 
II. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 4, at 255; Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitu-
tion: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1265 (1988); David M. Rabban, 
A Functional Analysis of Individual and Institutional Academic Freedom Under the First 
Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227 (1990). 
12. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
13. [d. at 250. 
14. See infra note 70. 
15. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262. 
16. The most helpful legal antecedents are state constitutional provisions granting gov-
ernance autonomy to state universities and the common law doctrine of academic abstention. 
See Byrne, supra note 4, at 323-31. 
17. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263. 
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Court viewed the university as creating the conditions under which free 
and valuable scholarship and teaching could exist. 
Subsequently, the Court gave indirect support to a First Amendment 
right of academic freedom. While opinions praised it in general terms, 
decisions seem to rest on other grounds and its reach and effect remained 
ambiguous. 18 The relationship between an individual right and an insti-
tutional right remained cloudy. And this confusion deepened when 
courts came to recognize free-standing First Amendment rights of free 
speech for students and faculty against state universities and for public 
employees generally against their employers. 19 Courts perceived that 
simultaneous individual and institutional rights could be inconsistent and 
even in conflict.20 The problem that constitutional academic freedom 
poses to the civil free speech rights of faculty is that it creates a presump-
tion against judicial involvement in deciding the contours of individual 
free speech against the university because courts are precluded from dis-
placing the system of speech operating within academia.21 
The Court resolved some of these ambiguities in Grutter. It relied 
on constitutional academic freedom to decide a major constitutional 
question that had long been a subject of public and scholarly debate-the 
constitutionality of racial preferences in higher education admissions. 
The Court held that the University of Michigan Law School's considera-
tion of race among other factors served a compelling interest in achiev-
ing, and was narrowly tailored to achieve, diversity in the student body.22 
The decision provides a new baseline for considering the strength and 
scope of constitutional academic freedom. Some commentators, none-
theless, continue to express doubt that Grutter actually embraced aca-
demic freedom, at least as I have defined it.23 
Below, I address several problems of academic governance that 
lately have been conspicuous and contentious. By considering whether 
they violate constitutional academic freedom, I hope both to illuminate 
that mysterious right after Grutter, and to offer perspectives on the spe-
18. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
19. See 1. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEO. 
L.J. 399 (1991). 
20. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985); Piarowski v. 
Ill. Cmty. Coil. Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985). 
21. See Byrne, supra note 6. Feldman v. Ho is an interesting example of a court strug-
gling to accommodate the free speech of a professor with the speech-evaluating role of the 
university. 171 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 1999)(Easterbrook, J.). 
22. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333-34 (2003). 
23. See, e.g., Richard H. Hiers, Institutional Academic Freedom-A Constitutional Mis-
conception: Did Grutter v. Bollinger Perpetuate the Confusion, 30 J.C. & U.L. 531 (2004); 
John LaNear, Academic Freedom in Public Higher Education: For the Faculty or Institution? 
(2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison). 
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cific problems analyzed. In general, I claim that Grutter clarified that 
academic freedom is a real constitutional right and that it primarily pro-
tects the autonomy of university governance on core matters relating to 
scholarship and teaching, including especially the values and practices 
that make up the non-legal system of academic freedom, but that it does 
not protect most university activities, which are fully subject to govern-
ment regulation. 
II. ApPLICATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
A. State Bans on Affirmative Action 
California adopted, in 1996, a state constitutional amendment ban-
ning the use of race in educational decision making, including student 
admissions.24 Activists in Michigan appear to have succeeded in placing 
a similar measure on the ballot for November 2006, and polls suggest 
widespread support.25 These measures seek to impose through the po-
litical process exactly those restraints on university self-governance the 
Supreme Court rejected in Grutter. These efforts may violate constitu-
tional academic freedom. Consideration of arguments on this point will 
illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of Grutter as a precedent. In 
brief, because Grutter confirmed that academic freedom is a constitu-
tional right that encompasses some affirmative action in admissions, 
these referenda must be unconstitutional. 
In Grutter, the question was whether race conscious admissions cri-
teria at the state law school violated the Equal Protection Clause. The 
plaintiffs had a strong case because the Court's precedents since 1989 
had established that race could be used in government decision making 
only to serve a compelling state interest in a narrowly tailored fashion, 
and the only such interest that had been identified was to remedy specific 
past discrimination.26 The state law school was considered to be the 
government for purposes of the state action doctrine; the Constitution di-
rectly regulated its behavior. If the Court had treated university decision 
24. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a) (approved Nov. 5, 1996) (codifying Proposition 209). 
25. Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, http://www.michigancivilrights.org (last visited July 
25, 2006) (containing the ballot language); see Peter Schmidt, Battle Over Race-Conscious 
Admissions Continues in Michigan, CHRON. HIGHER Eouc., Jan. 6,2006, at A34. 
26. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). The Grutter 
Court itself felt a need to "dispel the notion that the Law School's argument has been fore-
closed, either expressly or implicitly, by our affirmative-action cases decided since Bakke." 
539 U.S. at 328. It admitted that "some language in those opinions might be read to suggest 
that remedying past discrimination is the only permissible justification for race-based govern-
mental action." [d. 
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making about racial preferences as standing on the same normative foun-
dation as that of any other governmental entity, such as a city councilor 
fire department, the plaintiffs' case would likely prevail,27 
The Court held that the admissions program served a compelling 
state interest and was narrowly tailored to serve that interest.28 The 
holding that it served a compelling state interest depended on the ruling 
that university decisions on academic grounds about student admissions 
were protected by constitutional academic freedom. 29 The holding that it 
was narrowly tailored depended on the finding that the extent of the use 
of race reasonably related to the law school's educational goals of enli-
vening the classroom by admitting a class that was diverse in many re-
spects, including ethnicity. The weight given to the university's interest, 
adequate to overcome entrenched equal protection precedent against the 
use of race in decision making, must be understood as a holding that such 
core institutional choices are protected by the First Amendment. 30 
It is true that certain rhetorical ambiguities in Grutter raise doubts 
about the depth of the Court's commitment to this principle. The ringing 
endorsements of the constitutional status of Frankfurter's four freedoms 
in Grutter come in quotes from Justice Powell's Bakke decision.31 Jus-
tice O'Connor writes in the midst of her analysis: "In announcing the 
principle of student body diversity as a compelling state interest, Justice 
Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional dimension, 
grounded in the First Amendment, of educational autonomy.'>32 Justice 
O'Connor's own language is more circumspect, not going further than 
affirming in her own words the wisdom of deference to university ad-
ministrators in educational matters and that, due to "the expansive free-
doms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, 
27. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
28. Grntter, 539 U.S. at 343. 
29. [d. at 330. 
30. Although the Supreme Court had not specifically rejected a diversity rationale for 
affirmative action before Grntter, the tenor of its holdings since Bakke made the likelihood of 
it embracing diversity remote. In Metro Broad. Corp v. FCC, the Court employed an interme-
diate standard of review to uphold a federal affirmative action program in awarding broadcast-
ing licenses on the ground of promoting diversity of viewpoints. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). The 
Court subsequently rejected any use of the intermediate standard for racial classifications, 
overruling Metro Broadcasting. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227. Justice O'Connor 
dissented in Metro Broadcasting, writing: "Modem equal protection has recognized only one 
[compelling state] interest: remedying the effects of racial discrimination. The interestin in-
creasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly not a compelling interest. It is simply 
too amorphous, too insubstantial, and too unrelated to any legitimate basis for employing ra-
cial classifications." 497 U.S. at 612. 
31. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
32. Grntter, 539 U.S. at 330 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312). 
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universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition."33 She 
also took care to cite the views of non-academics to provide independent 
grounds to think that some affirmative action in admissions was socially 
desirable.34 These "tea leaves" at least raise some doubt about the solid-
ity of the right and how the Supreme Court would deal with other ques-
tions about university autonomy. However, the ruling on admissions cer-
tainly seems firm. Quoting with approval language from prior opinions 
signals assent to the principals enunciated in the quotes.35 After Grutter 
no lower court can reasonably question that constitutional academic 
freedom is a right protected by the First Amendment, and lower courts 
since Grutter consistently have so read it.36 
Grutter cannot mean that diversity itself generally is a compelling 
state interest that justifies affirmative action. That proposition would 
swallow all the holdings rejecting it for contractors or school teachers.37 
33. Id. 
34. Thus, Justice O'Connor found that the law school's view that racial diversity would 
enhance the quality of education to be "not theoretical but real" based on representations of 
business executives and military leaders in amici briefs. /d. 
35. See Neal Kumer Katyal, The Promise and Precondition of Educational Autonomy, 31 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 557, 563 (2003) ("The discussion of academic freedom in Grutter, in 
short, was not some afterthought, shorn of history or precedential support. Rather the concept 
was built on a recognition of the First Amendment concerns of government intrusion into 
higher education, coupled with a healthy skepticism about the ability of generalist federal 
courts to make decisions for a university with respect to learning. "). 
36. See, e.g., Flint v. Dennison, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1221 (D. Mont. 2005) (upholding 
university cap on student government campaign expenditures); Nieman v. Yale Univ., 851 
A.2d 1165, 1172 (Conn. 2005) (grounding deference to university'S evaluation of candidate 
for tenure in First Amendment). 
The importance of constitutional academic freedom to the Grutter decision may be seen 
in current litigation about student racial diversity in primary and secondary schools, which are 
not protected by constitutional academic freedom. The Court recently granted certiorari to 
review two lower court decisions upholding the limited use of race to enhance diversity in 
public high school student assignments. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. I, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) (en bane), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006); 
McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. 
Ct. 2351 (2006). These cases are important and difficult precisely because academic freedom 
does not enhance constitutionally the school districts' interests in diversity. For example, 
Judge Bea's dissent in Parents Involved detailed the absence of any constitutional tradition of 
deference to high schools as compared with the academic freedom of universities and ex-
plained the reasons for a different approach. 426 F.3d at 1207-08. Nonetheless, programs 
enhancing racial diversity may serve compelling state interests other than those enshrined in 
academic freedom. But the lower court opinions in these cases highlight how crucial constitu-
tional academic freedom was to Grutter. 
37. Elhnic diversity anl0ng students at any educational level would seem to have educa-
tional value. However, at least a plurality of the Court has rejected the goal of providing "role 
models" for high school students as a rationale for protecting minority teachers from layoffs. 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986). The "role model" approach for 
teachers seems analogous to a diversity argunlent for students. It does seem right that the 
Court should adopt some lesser standard of review for reasonable, good faith efforts by school 
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It seems that in the Court's view, diversity needs to be connected with 
some other value that it furthers to have constitutional traction. In Grut-
ter, diversity contributed to a compelling state interest because university 
officials reasonably concluded that it would advance educational goals, 
and judicial deference to this judgment served a constitutional value. Of 
course, there may be other contexts within which diversity may be found 
compelling without any boost from academic freedom, but those judg-
ments must be justified on quite different grounds.38 
From my reading of Grutter, strong arguments arise that any state 
law that bars the use of race in state university admissions violates con-
stitutional academic freedom. Academic freedom is protected by the 
federal Constitution and includes the authority to use race to some extent. 
Therefore, any state law-whether passed by initiative or legislature, 
whether having statutory or constitutional status under state law-that 
purports to deprive universities of authority to consider race in admis-
sions at all violates the federal Constitution.39 The only point at which 
opponents could attack this syllogism as a matter of legal reasoning is on 
the premise that academic freedom is a constitutional right. Although the 
Court has invoked academic freedom in striking down at least one state 
statute and in enjoining executive action,40 it more often has employed it 
as a counter to constitutional arguments posed by challengers to univer-
sity actions, as providing weight to university interests.41 Grutter itself 
is the prime example. However, it would introduce a novel notion of 
what is a constitutional right to hold that one has special, constitutional 
weight against other constitutionally protected interests while still being 
boards that seek to preserve elusive racial diversity in public schools. See Parents Involved, 
426 F.3d at 1193, 1196 (Kozinski, l., concurring); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d I, 
27 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, C.l., concurring). 
38. See, e.g., supra notes 36-37 (discussing high school cases). 
39. What would be the analysis of a state statute requiring a state university to admit a 
racially diverse student body? If the correct reading of Grutter were that diversity generally 
was a compelling state interest, then such a statute, if narrowly tailored, might well be consti-
tutional. Under my approach, the question would turn on whether a university would be found 
to have "academic grounds" upon which to choose a less diverse student body than the statute 
would require. One could imagine a set of facts in which an engineering school, for example, 
legitimately could defend on academic grounds taking the best-qualified students based only 
on math and science grades even though their student body was grossly disproportionately 
Asian. 
40. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 593-96, 604 (1967) (striking down a loy-
alty oath created by state statute); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (overturn-
ing a contempt conviction of a professor who refused to answer questions by state attorney 
general about the content of the professor's lectures and the professor's knowledge of a par-
ticular political party). 
41. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,227-28 (1985) (rejecting a 
student's substantive due process challenge to grading). 
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vulnerable to state legislation. The fonnerly recognized constitutional 
interest of an individual to be free from rejection on account of her race 
would seem as weighty in constitutional analysis as the political interests 
of state voters. Again, even if the Supreme Court might eventually draw 
such uncouth and gossamer distinctions, it is doubtful that any lower 
court would. 
What is surprising about this analysis is that a state should be pow-
erless to control the admissions policy of its state university, funded sub-
stantially by state tax revenues. Perhaps it seems even more peculiar that 
the voters could not regulate admissions policy through initiative, argua-
bly the most "democratic" political mechanism open to the people. And 
courts might accommodate these expectations as prudential matters. But, 
this is the chief point in favor of constitutional academic freedom as an 
institutional right: that the government is excluded from "the intellectual 
life of a university."42 The special values of free scholarship and teach-
ing flourish when protected from control by a democratic state or elec-
torate because they involve scholarly, educational, and scientific judg-
ments that most of us cannot competently make most of the time. The 
core decisions captured in the four freedoms represent the essential cita-
del of academic governance, and constitutional academic freedom places 
large barriers against political dictation of these decisions. 
From one perspective, at least, this claim may seem appalling. The 
state creates and funds its state universities and governs them in myriad 
ways to which no one would raise a constitutional objection. This point 
of course is true and highlights the surprising feature of constitutional 
academic freedom-that it provides federal constitutional freedoms to a 
state instrumentality against the state itself.43 Nearly every academic 
freedom case in the Supreme Court has involved a state university. But 
this may merely be an artifact of the unique history of higher education 
in the United States, with state and private institutions growing together, 
competing with one another, and sharing most mores and practices. Of 
course, it emphasizes the necessity of construing the area of institutional 
autonomy against the larger field of undoubted governmental control. 
State constitutional decisions protecting the autonomy of state universi-
ties from legislative control provide a useful model of such adjudica-
tion.44 Many of these questions are difficult, but inclusion within the 
protected sphere of using race as a factor in admissions is the question 
42. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 261 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
43. See Byrne, supra note 4, at 300. 
44. Id.at327-30. 
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incontrovertibly settled by Grutter. State initiatives seeking to reverse 
that decision must be unconstitutional. 
B. Academic Bill of Rights 
This section, as well as the next, examines the scope of constitu-
tional academic freedom. What kind of legal enactments does it protect 
against? This section first considers proposed state statutes that would 
require schools to hire faculty of diverse views and require faculty to 
present a range of views in class on controversial subjects. I argue that 
such statutes would violate constitutional academic freedom because 
they would displace academic control of core educational decisions with 
lay political control. The next section considers an argument advanced 
in a recent case: that legislative mandates requiring schools to permit the 
military to recruit students on campus violate academic freedom. I argue 
that academic freedom does not extend to peripheral student services like 
job placement, which are remote from core concerns about scholarship 
and teaching. Each contemporary concern addressed is important in its 
own right, and considered together they show the powerful but limited 
reach of constitutional academic freedom. 
What is the scope of constitutional academic freedom? One faces 
real difficulty in distinguishing the government's legitimate interest in 
regulating the higher education establishment that it supports financially 
and upon which depend important public interests from the area appro-
priately subject to academic autonomy. The constitutional text offers no 
help because constitutional academic freedom is an indirect judicial 
elaboration from those protections necessary to maintain the freedom and 
quality of scholarship and teaching. Any articulation of the standard 
must be applied in light of the liberal values and traditions of American 
higher education. Any special protection of decision making must be 
rooted in the values of the First Amendment; the Constitution protects 
some university decision making only in order to protect a communal 
system of intellectual exchange sheltered by it. Protecting institutional 
autonomy is the means and preserving the scholarship and teaching is the 
end. Seeking to protect aspects of autonomy removed from this will fail 
and threaten to bring the entire right into disrepute as a simple "interest," 
like users of subsidized irrigation.45 
45. In a thoughtful recent article, Professor Paul Horwitz argues that constitutional aca-
demic freedom may be conceived not primarily as protecting scholarship and teaching, but as 
shielding the university understood as a "small-scale model of and gateway for a democracy." 
Horwitz, supra note 2, at 556. Some language in Grutter surely supports this reading. Some 
of Horwitz's argument pursues broader theoretical debates about the First Amendment gener-
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The four freedoms provide a standard for decision that has been 
surprisingly successful. Frankfurter did not present them in Sweezy as 
providing a rule of decision as much as inspiring slogans, referring to the 
statement of the South African professors as the "latest" and "most 
poignant" expression of the "dependence of a free society on free univer-
sities."46 He did not use any of the freedoms to delineate the appropriate 
realm of state regulation from that of protected freedom; instead, he used 
the blunt instrument of "the exclusion of governmental intervention in 
the intellectual life of a university," which was sufficient to condemn the 
government intimidation present in the case.47 Moreover, they do not 
help much in resolving internal conflicts within the institution, for exam-
ple, indicating whether the case would have come out the same if a dean 
or trustee had asked Paul Sweezy the same questions about his lecture. 
The South African statement of the four freedoms crucially required 
that any protected decision be made "on academic grounds." Universi-
ties are large, complex organizations moved by a variety of motives, in-
cluding hunger for resources and raw competitive advantage. The need 
to connect a decision to academic concerns directs attention to the goals 
of scholarship and teaching directly advanced by the authority. Justice 
Powell's opinion in Bakke draws this distinction helpfully. In that case, 
he found that the medical school's interest in social justice did not fall 
within its academic realm but was better left to the political branches. Its 
interest in promoting a diversity of voices within the classroom could fall 
within that scope and should be protected.48 Moreover, he tailored the 
scope of the protected authority to that of the academic interest, holding 
that diversity could be a factor among other academic criteria for admis-
sion, but that there could not be a quota for any race, an approach that 
ally, which I cannot pursue. Still, academic freedom makes no sense as a constitutional right if 
severed from the knowledge value of scholarship and teaching. In earlier work, I argued that 
many functions of a university umelated to teaching and scholarship might be labeled "democ-
ratic," justifYing regulation by democratically elected officials. Byrne, supra note 4, at 332-
33. 
46. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262. 
47. [d. In his critique of institutional academic freedom, Professor Richard Hiers makes 
much of the limitations of the South African statement as a legal authority for academic free-
dom. Hiers, supra note 23, at 533-35. I agree that Frankfurter's use of the statement is anoma-
lous. Byrne, supra note 4, at 292. But far more important to Frankfurter and to the Court in 
1957 was the havoc wrought by McCarthy-era pressures on faculties. The Court seemed con-
cerned only about external, political threats to academic freedom. Once again, the life of the 
law proved to be experience, not logic. 
48. Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306-09 (1978) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring) (explaining the lack of competence and authority of a university to make 
findings concerning past societal discrimination) with id. at 311-14 (discussing a university's 
competence and constitutionally-sanctioned authority to determine that racial diversity will 
enhance education). 
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might have been permissible if the decision had been grounded in social 
justice at large. Similarly, the Court has rejected university arguments 
for deference when it has failed to see the direct connection with aca-
demic concerns, as in its decision to subject NCAA football television 
contracts to antitrust analysis.49 The relation of autonomy to academic 
work, captured in a claim to protect amateurism, simply seemed too re-
mote. The galloping commercialization of college football understanda-
bly removed that extracurricular activity from the purview of teaching 
and scholarship. 
Courts also have repeatedly held in Title VII cases that universities 
have no academic interest in discriminating against women and minority 
faculty in hiring and promotion, even though such cases involve deter-
minations of "who may teach."50 Universities have not made this argu-
ment as such; it is interesting that they articulate an academic case for in-
clusion but not exclusion. Prejudice is not an academic value, of course. 
A university's claim in such cases is that the judicial inquiry threatens 
peer review by exposing deliberations and subjecting ostensible aca-
demic decision to the test of whether it is pretextual. These are not easy 
process issues, but courts have insisted on the propriety of condemning 
race and sex discrimination and applying familiar procedures to uncover 
it. However, courts also have exercised restraint in displacing what ap-
pear to be bona fide academic judgments about competence. While 
commentators may reasonably differ about whether the courts have 
struck the right balance between protecting individuals against discrimi-
nation and protecting academic decision making, there cannot be much 
doubt that they have sought to distinguish decision making on academic 
grounds from invalid or subjective prejudice. 
The Academic Bill of Rights (ABR) has been promoted by a cam-
paign spearheaded by activist David Horowitz, under the auspices of an 
organization known as Students for Academic Freedom.51 It addresses 
an alleged problem of political bias and indoctrination by predominantly 
"liberal" or "leftist" faculty.52 The proposed solution is for legislatures 
to direct boards of state universities to implement policies or procedures 
that safeguard academic freedom as the legislation defmes it. Although 
bills have been introduced in eighteen states and in the U.S. House of 
49. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 u.s. 85, 98-99 (1984). 
50. Walker v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 300 F. Supp. 2d 836, 851 (W.D. 
Wis. 2004); see Univ. ofPa. v. EEOC, 493 u.s. 182, 195-197 (1990). 
51. Academic Bill of Rights, http://www.studentsforacademicfreedom.org/abor.html (last 
visited July 19, 2006). 
52. See DAVID HOROWITZ, THE PROFESSORS: THE 101 MOST DANGEROUS ACADEMICS 
IN AMERICA (2006) (detailing the position of the "insurgents"). 
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Representatives, no state has enacted any of the bills. In Colorado, the 
presidents of the state's public universities agreed to a Memorandum of 
Understanding to, inter alia, "review its students [sic] rights and campus 
grievance procedures to ensure that political diversity is explicitly recog-
nized and protected. "53 
The ABR has been denounced by numerous faculty groups54 and 
the American Association of University Professors55 as a violation of the 
principles of academic freedom. There are three chief elements that 
elicit faculty ire. First, the ABR places a duty on faculty to present a di-
versity of views on controversial subjects covered in class. 56 Second, it 
directs schools to hire faculty members to foster "a plurality of method-
ologies and perspectives." 57 Third, institutions are directed to establish 
procedures for implementing these and other principles. 58 The overall 
complaints are that these requirements impose political rather than aca-
demic criteria for class content and faculty hiring, that they will make 
faculty answerable to some non-expert body for decisions about class 
coverage and hiring, and that the overall effect of these will chill teach-
ing and scholarship. 59 
To. date, arguments about the propriety of the ABR have remained 
on the level of political and academic principles. Reaction to the ABR 
will turn to some extent on whether one perceives a widespread or sys-
tematic problem of leftist bias in university teaching.60 A preponderance 
53. Memorandum of Understanding (Mar. 18, 2004), http://www.studentsforacdemic 
freedom.org. 
54. See, e.g., Jennifer Howard, MLA Offers Preview of Report on Tenure and Votes to 
Oppose 'Academic Bill of Rights,' CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 13,2006, at A18. 
55. Attacks on Academic Freedom and Independence of Colleges and Universities, 2005 
Annual Meeting Resolution, http://www.aaup.orgistatementslResolutions/AFattacks.htm 
(posted June 15, 2005). 
56. Academic Bill of Rights, supra note 51. 
57. !d. 
58. [d. 
59. The historian of McCarthyism in higher education writes: 
Despite its heavy reliance on the traditional rhetoric of academic freedom, the "aca-
demic bill of rights" seriously undermines that freedom. By injecting extraneous 
political considerations into personnel and curricular decisions, the measure not 
only interferes with those areas of educational policy that are the traditional respon-
sibility of the faculty, it also disregards the professional standards that guarantee the 
quality of American higher education. 
Academe maintains those standards by policing itself through peer review .... 
. . . Professors must make the main decisions about hiring, tenure, promotion, and 
curriculum .... 
Ellen Schrecker, Worse Than McCarthy, CHRON. HIGHER EOUc., Feb. 10, 2006, at B20. 
60. It must be said that Horowitz and his associates have not made much of a showing. 
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of faculty to the left is not the same thing as teaching from any perspec-
tive that crosses a professional line into indoctrination. Most faculty---of 
all political stripes-present various viewpoints and encourage students 
to do so; departures from these norms come more frequently from intel-
lectual enthusiasm or arrogance than from political passion. While de-
bate about the ABR has been largely wholesome, actual legislative en-
actment would harm more than help free teaching and scholarship. 
Would enactment of the ABR violate constitutional academic free-
dom? One might plausibly argue that the ABR could be implemented in 
a manner that would enhance rather than impair academic freedom. Fac-
ulty may not ethically reject candidates based on the political tendencies 
of their work. More generally, professors treating ideas with which they 
disagree respectfully and even presenting them in their best light in class 
or scholarship further the values of academic freedom. A school might 
implement a statute judiciously, affording substantial deference to fac-
ulty within each department to define the range of reasonable scholarly 
dispute within its field and craft mechanisms of oversight that defer sub-
stantially to scholarly expertise in hiring and setting curriculum. Thus, 
one might continue in a strictly legal argument, the legislation should not 
be found to violate constitutional academic freedom on its face. Courts 
should wait to scrutinize specific applications for excessive political in-
trusion. 
This argument, however, should fail: enactment of the ABR would 
immediately violate constitutional academic freedom on its face. First, 
legislators would be providing rules for the conduct of core university 
In a recent hearing before Pennsylvania legislators, he had to back off of accusations of class-
room bias against two professors for lack of evidence. The scholarship in Horowitz's recent 
book, supra note 52, has been subjected to withering criticism. For example, Neil Gross, a 
sociology professor at Harvard, points out that sampling biases in Horowitz's book make his 
claim that the individual professors he attacks are "representative" so implausible as to "fail[] 
to distinguish partisanship from serious social scientific research." Neil Gross, Right, Left, and 
Wrong: David Horowitz's Latest Attack on America's Left-Leaning College Professors 
Doesn't Add Up, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2006, at D I O. 
Horowitz lists two of my colleagues at Georgetown University Law Center, David Cole 
and Mari Matsuda, among the dangerous. The accounts of them are nothing but contemptible 
character assassinations, fraught with errors. One error concerning Professor Matsuda touches 
me directly. She is accused of being responsible for the "Speech and Expression Policy" at 
Georgetown University. HOROWITZ, supra note 52, at 278. In fact, Professor Matsuda had 
nothing to do with the creation of that policy. I was a principle author of the policy, along 
with a Jesuit theologian and Georgetown's current president. See Speech and Expression Pol-
icy, http://www.georgetown.edulstudent-affiars/policies.html#speechandexpressionpolicy (last 
visited July 19,2006). The main purpose of the policy was to establish formally, for the first 
time, a right of free expression for all members of the Georgetown community, as a commit-
ment to what Georgetown thinks is entailed in being a Catholic and Jesuit university. It does 
exclude from protection some hate speech, although the book weirdly misquotes the policy. 
HOROWITZ, supra note 52, at 278. 
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functions encompassed within the four freedoms and determining on 
academic grounds who may teach and what may be taught. Such rules 
would not prohibit denying appointments on non-academic grounds, 
such as race or sex discrimination, but would encourage appointments 
based on the political tendencies of the ideas propounded by the candi-
date. This entangles political power with academic judgment in a way 
that threatens systematic corruption. It matters greatly that the ABR 
represents a political effort to change the content of teaching and schol-
arship within existing fields through political action. In the language of 
Sweezy, it constitutes a "governmental intrusion into the intellectual life 
ofa university."61 
Second, courts also should invalidate the ABR as vague and over-
broad. These doctrines have special salience in the First Amendment 
context because vague and overbroad statutes will inhibit exercise of im-
portant freedoms.62 In the context of the ABR, it is evident, for example, 
that a statutory right for a student to be "presented diverse approaches 
and dissenting sources and viewpoints within the instructional setting"63 
could be applied to protected speech or conduct and that doubt about its 
reach could inhibit both teachers and administrators in protected curricu-
lar choices. The Supreme Court already has struck down on vagueness 
grounds a New York statutory and regulatory scheme to prevent the em-
ployment of disloyal faculty and staff by, inter alia, requiring removal 
for "seditious" acts or utterances, citing the importance of not inhibiting 
academic freedom, despite the possibility of constitutional application.64 
In analogous decisions, courts unanimously struck down university 
speech codes directed at racial insults or sexual harassment for being 
overbroad and vague.65 The student speech codes of the 1990s and the 
ABR are alike in their mixed goals of enhancing education in certain di-
rections and shifting balances of power on campus; they differ crucially 
in that the former were freely adopted by schools to address harms they 
saw, while the ABR would be imposed by legislation.66 Courts that 
61. 354 U.S. 234, 261 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
62. E.g., Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 
U.S. 518, 527-28 (1972). 
63. College Access and Opportunity Act of 2005, H.R. 609, 109th Congo § 103 
(1 )(a)(2)(C) (as introduced in House, Feb. 8, 2005). 
64. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 597-99 (1967) ("The crucial considera-
tion is that no teacher can know just where the line is drawn between 'seditious' and nonsedi-
tious utterances and acts. "). 
65. See, e.g., Cohen V. San Bernardino Valley Coli., 92 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 1996); 
UMW Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1173 (E.D. Wis. 
1991). 
66. No one denied that the litigated speech codes could be applied in a constitutional 
manner. Another interesting difference is that while the speech codes arguably impinged on 
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found the speech codes vague and overbroad certainly should find the 
ABR to be so too. Moreover, courts have shown little patience with po-
litical measures that exert indirect influence over teaching and scholar-
ship,67 something accomplished and probably intended to be accom-
plished by mere passage of the ABR legislation. 
A key flaw in the arguments for the ABR is that faculties have no 
obligation to be viewpoint neutral in any constitutional sense regarding 
substantive disputes within their disciplines. While scholars need to deal 
honestly with all views, they do not need to treat any view as valuable or 
include it within the body of work to which they refer in addressing the 
issues they think important for their own work. In fields liable to contro-
versy, scholarly critics will judge any scholar's work, in part, by the au-
thor's choice of and commentary on existing work. Injecting political 
controls or pressures into this process must distort both production and 
critique.68 
This is at the core of the difference between academic freedom and 
free speech generally. While government actors need to be neutral in the 
various substantive disputes, university faculties need not and, perhaps, 
should not be. The Court has struggled with this distinction in address-
ing university rules for extracurricular student speech, generally requir-
ing some form of content neutrality in allocating benefits to student 
groups.69 Concurring opinions in those cases cautioned the majorities 
not to slight the primary role of the university in making judgments about 
which speech activities are more valuable to educational goals.7o While 
the Court as a whole has tended to treat extracurricular speech as a mat-
ter of civic free speech, it never has suggested that curricular speech 
needed to conform to civic norms. Within the curriculum, the need for 
making judgments of quality and suitability precludes judges from con-
straining academic choices to effectuate any version of civic neutrality. 
individual free speech rights, the ABR would invade rights that are primarily institutional or at 
least professional. 
67. See, e.g., Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coli., 260 F.3d 671,678-80,682 (6th Cir. 2001); 
Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85,89-90 (2d Cir. 1992). 
68. This is not to say that individual scholars do not descend to political prejudice, jeal-
ousy, or spite in indicating what other work they think valuable, whether in writing, teaching, 
or evaluating in an appointments or tenure process. But these are widely recognized as fail-
ings. My argument is that a legislative fix for such failings endangers the principle by which 
we know that they are failings and the process that usually corrects for them. 
69. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229-32 (2000); 
Widmarv. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273-78 (1981). 
70. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 238-39 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[W]e have spoken in tenus 
of a wide protection for the academic freedom and autonomy that bars legislatures (and courts) 
from imposing conditions on the spectrum of subjects taught and viewpoints expressed in col-
lege teaching .... "); see also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 278-79 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
HeinOnline -- 77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 946 2006
946 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 
Consideration of the ABR emphasizes that academic freedom pro-
tects the autonomy of decision making on academic values by the appro-
priate academics. The displacement of academic speech nonns by civic 
or political speech nonns would undennine the disciplinary and educa-
tional purposes of higher education. This point can be generalized to 
other important but currently donnant debates. 
Universities should have authority under constitutional academic 
freedom to penalize student speech without intellectual value that seri-
ously interferes with other students' abilities to obtain an education.71 
Similarly invalid should be a California statute that gives students at pri-
vate universities the same free speech rights that students at public insti-
tutions have against their schools.72 Finally to be condemned is the New 
Jersey state constitutional doctrine under which someone who was not a 
member of the academic community in any way-in fact he was a La-
rouche activist-was found to have the right to leaflet on a private uni-
versity campus.73 
In each of these cases, legislative or judicial nonns of civic liberty 
displaced academic rules designed, not always faultlessly, to protect 
study and reasoned discourse. Of course, they involved only contested 
areas of extracurricular life where academic and civic nonns co-exist. 
But they exemplify the threat, made manifest in the Academic Bill of 
Rights, to wield partial notions of civic rights to sweep away regulatory 
mechanisms, such as peer review, designed to keep universities directed 
toward education and scholarship. A virtue of constitutional academic 
freedom is that it provides a constitutional discourse in which this con-
flict of important values can be explicated and resolved so as to protect 
traditional academic values. 
C. Claims of Academic Freedom in Rumsfeld v. FAIR74 
This section looks to clarify the boundaries of constitutional aca-
demic freedom by disagreeing with a recent claim of application of that 
71. See Byrne, supra note 19. I maintain this view notwithstanding the unanimous lower 
court decisions finding them unconstitutional, usually on grounds of overbreadth and vague-
ness. See Byrne, supra note 6, at 100-07. But see Southworth, 529 U.S.at 238-39 (Souter, J., 
concurring) (suggesting that the four freedoms might shield university student speech codes). 
72. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West 2002). A California court relied on this provision 
ill striking duwn Stanford's student speech code. Corry v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., No. 
740309 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995), available at http://www.ithaca.edulfaculty/ cdun-
can/265/corryvstanford.htrn (last visited July 19,2006). 
73. State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980), appeal dismissed sub nom., Princeton 
Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982). 
74. 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) [hereinafter FAIR]. 
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right. To be acceptable within constitutional law, and in conflict with 
democratic decision making, academic freedom must be neither protean 
nor imperial. It must be restricted to providing institutional autonomy 
for decisions on academic grounds concerning core intellectual interests 
in teaching and scholarship. Thus, it may be valuable to consider in 
some detail why academic freedom should not be held to protect institu-
tional rules for student placement services. 
Most areas of state regulation and control of universities do not con-
flict with academic freedom. For most purposes, universities can be 
regulated like any non-profit corporation. Moreover, state universities 
are arms of state government and subject to pervasive governance tied to 
funding, labor standards, and property management. Some state consti-
tutions create state university systems as a separate branch of govern-
ment, providing structural and principled protections for educational de-
cision making. These provisions anticipate to some extent the federal 
constitutional right, although the state provisions predate the federal right 
by as much as one hundred yearsJ5 In an earlier paper, I argued that 
government could regulate those aspects of university business that 
"promote democratic values" such as access, sports, staff employment, 
and applied research, but could not interfere with scholarship, liberal 
education, and the system of individual academic freedom that fosters 
them.76 Another more doctrinal way of putting this might be that consti-
tutional academic freedom protects the four freedoms of a university, but 
most government regulation does not substantially burden these core 
rights. These core rights are deeply anti-majoritarian because they rest 
on the judgment that academic speech, in which not every citizen may 
participate, has a particular, beneficial relationship to the search for truth 
that justifies a distinct form of First Amendment protectionJ7 The spe-
cial value of teaching and scholarship can be protected constitutionally 
only if drawn narrowly not to impinge on the appropriate prerogatives of 
popular law making.78 
The Solomon Amendment requires universities to allow the military 
access to campus to recruit students, even though the military violates a 
75. See Byrne, supra note 4, at 327 n.303 (listing state constitutional provisions). Lewis 
Menand described academic freedom as a "deal" between professors and American society 
whereby academics would commit themselves to the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in ex-
change for political non-interference in university affairs. LEWIS MENAND, THE 
METAPHYSICAL CLUB 417 (2001). 
76. Byrne, supra note 4, at 332-39. 
77. Byrne, supra note 6, at 138-40. 
78. One court has explicitly rejected any individual right of academic freedom because it 
would give greater speech rights to professors than to other citizens. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 
F.3d 401, 411 n.13 (4th Cir. 2000) (en bane). 
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school's policy prohibitting employer discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation, or face loss of federal funds. 79 The Third Circuit held 
that the Solomon Amendment violates the First Amendment, relying on 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, and the Supreme Court unanimously re-
versed.80 The appeals court relied on the associational speech rights am-
plified in Dale, which might create a general form of institutional speech 
autonomy different from academic freedom. 8 I The Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed, holding that "FAIR has attempted to stretch" the 
holding of Dale, and "[t]he Solomon Amendment neither limits what law 
schools may say nor requires them to say anything."82 
Various entities argued that the Solomon Amendment violates aca-
demic freedom, claiming that law schools express their values and con-
vey them to students by adopting policies governing employers recruit-
ing on campus. The Supreme Court kindly ignored these arguments. I 
address them here, however, because they represent a misguided effort to 
"stretch" institutional academic freedom beyond the breaking point. In-
voking academic freedom here is unpersuasive. 
First, universities do not teach primarily through inculcation or 
modeling appropriate conduct but through study and discussion. Admit-
tedly, professors should model an appropriate regard for truth and respect 
diversity of thoughtful viewpoints, and their commitment to doing so 
both enables liberal education to occur and supports academic freedom 
for the classroom. However, this is quite remote from students learning 
through observing institutional adherence to even important norms 
adopted by national educational organizations. Young people "learn" 
from observing hypocrisy and faithfulness by all sorts of institutions and 
individuals, but this is not the kind of structured, analytic teaching dis-
tinctive to higher education that justifies academic freedom protections. 
There are special problems for professional schools because they 
seek to prepare students to engage in a self-directed manner in the world 
through exercising distinctive skills. Professional schools appropriately 
have commitments to certain ethical norms and to conveying them to 
their students. The law schools in FAIR emphasized the law's ethical 
commitment to equality of opportunity without regard to sexual orienta-
79. 10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (1998 & Supp. 2006). The statute only requires schools to provide 
military recruiters access equal to that provided other recruiters, but the Court construed the 
language to mean access equal to recruiters that do not discriminate. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 
1305-06. 
80. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 
2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006). 
81. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). The best part of this holding is the ironic twist turning Dale's 
protection of homophobia against the homophobic purpose of the Solomon Amendment. 
82. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1307, 1313. 
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tion. These normative commitments can be compatible with academic 
freedom, even when at times they constrain the range of debate, because 
the ethical commitments provide a framework for the educational enter-
prise itself. Academic freedom shields the teaching of these norms in the 
curriculum (so long as teachers and students have reasonable opportuni-
ties to criticize them) but cannot protect the norms themselves from dis-
placement by other civic norms.83 
Second, the underlying dispute in FAIR is about control over the 
terms for on-campus employment recruiting, not for scholarship and 
teaching. The Solomon Amendment places no constraints on any of the 
four freedoms.84 The Supreme Court seems to view the extra-curriculum 
as an area where universities may pursue educational goals, but must do 
so in accord with civic norms.85 But the military recruiters do not come 
to campus to debate the role of gays in the military, only to enlist em-
ployees. Thus, recruiters are not even engaged in the type of political 
speech common in extracurricular settings (and certainly do not disrupt 
the political speech occurring on campus) but only in something akin to 
commercial speech.86 Recruiting rules are one of many important areas 
of university concern that do not fall within the rationale of constitutional 
academic freedom. 
Finally, while the Association of American Law Schools and many 
law professors understandably oppose the Solomon Amendment, a uni-
83. See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom and Political Neutrality in Law Schools: An 
Essay on Structure and Ideology in Professional Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 315, 329-31 
(1993). 
84. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1307 ("The Solomon Amendment neither limits what law schools 
may say nor requires them to say anything. Law schools remain free under the statute to ex-
press whatever views they may have on the military's congressionally mandated employment 
policy, all the while retaining eligibility for federal funds."). 
85. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) 
(upholding mandatory student fees to fund extracurricular speech because of educational pur-
pose, so long as fund awards are viewpoint neutral). 
86. Commercial speech is generally thought to be entitled to less protection than other 
speech. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n ofN.Y., 447 U.S. 557 
(1980). The issue in FAIR is not whether a state university can regulate commercial speech on 
its campus. Cf Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. V. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (university's 
substantial interest in preserving educational atmosphere on campus justifies some restrictions 
on commercial solicitations). However, the peripheral relation of employment recruitment to 
education is highlighted by considering the nature of the speech that Congress sought to pro-
tect from university ban. 
It may be argued that compelled military recruiting on campus resembles the New 
Jersey rule permitting citizens to enter campuses to leaflet, which I argued should be found 
unconstitutional. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. In both cases, universities are 
restricted from controlling outsiders from speaking on campus, although in neither case are 
teaching and scholarship directly impaired. But the New Jersey rule has a far larger potential 
to disrupt the educational mission because it generally authorizes many outside speakers to 
distract students and teachers in the public areas of campuses. 
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versity's opposition to the Solomon Amendment cannot claim any more 
privileged foundation than that of any other social institution. This is not 
an area where faculty have any special expertise to which society should 
defer. Moreover, the attempt to claim academic freedom protection for 
excluding the military risks bringing the entire right into disrepute as 
mere special pleading.87 
To amplify my concerns, I take issue specifically with the brief 
amicus curiae filed in the Supreme Court by the AAUP, the foremost in-
stitutional authority on academic freedom.88 This brief, signed by some 
of the nation's best scholars of constitutional academic freedom and free 
speech, appears to me to present a potentially disastrous argument be-
cause it acknowledges no principled limit to the autonomy that a univer-
sity can claim. The AAUP argument takes off from the safe ground that 
some academic governance decisions are protected by the Constitution. 
The brief then claims: 
87. Judge Wilkins was quite wrong to criticize claims of constitutional academic freedom 
for giving greater rights to professors than to other citizens. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 
401,411 n.13 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Constitutional academic freedom exists to protect a 
uniquely valuable process of seeking truth and educating students that redounds to the benefit 
of society at large. Byrne, supra note 6, at 138. But the Fourth Circuit's suspicion of special 
privilege demonstrates the need to confine claims of institutional autonomy to the core aca-
demic activities related to teaching and scholarship captured in the four freedoms. 
88. Brief for American Association of University Professors as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Respondents, FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (No. 04-1152), available at http://www.aaup.orgl Le-
gaVcases/SolomonAmendmentAmicusBrief.pdf [hereinafter AAUP Brief]. Friends at the 
AAUP could plausibly view this critique as requiring real chutzpah, given that I concluded a 
recent article by urging AAUP and other higher education associations to file more amicus 
briefs defending institutional academic freedom. Byrne, supra. note 6, at 141. But the content 
of such briefs, of course, remains a matter of urgent discussion. 
Other briefs touched only gently on academic freedom as support for a civic First 
Amendment right. See, e.g., Brief of Association of American Law Schools as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (No. 04-1152). 
A remarkably perverse brief amicus curiae was filed for the Center for Individual 
Rights and several individuals, arguing that the Solomon Amendment "enhances" academic 
freedom by requiring law schools to permit the military recruiters to convey their messages to 
students on campus. The premise of the argument was that academic freedom was a right pri-
marily of students to receive diverse messages. The brief essentially ignored the history of 
academic freedom, Supreme Court precedents concerning institutional autonomy, and the "ex-
clusion of government intervention in the intellectual life of a university." Instead, the brief 
treated precedents restricting state university control over student extracurricular speech as 
warranting the government to dictate that outsiders should be able to speak to students on 
campus. Such an approach would, of course, destroy academic freedom, both in the profes-
sional and constitutional sense, but seems calculated to lay the groundwork for government 
intervention on campus through devices like the Academic Bill of Rights. Brief for Center for 
Individual Rights as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (No. 04-
1152), available at http://www.cir-usa.orglreleasesI77.html. 
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It follows that academic freedom also protects faculty policies that set 
forth criteria for advancing students into postgraduate employment 
and seek to instill educational values that students will carry with 
them into· that employment. Preparing students for future employ-
ment is, after all, the ultimate function of the university in our soci-
ety.89 
951 
The AAUP argument extends to peripheral institutional activities beyond 
the essentially intellectual foundations of constitutional academic free-
dom. Regulating the human rights policies of potential employers does 
not affect the standards or processes of research, scholarship, or liberal 
education. 
The AAUP brief goes so far as to belie the cherished goals of ad-
vancing truth, or forming free intellects, by claiming wrongly that "in-
stilling" correct values in future employees is the core of the university's 
mission. Inculcation of human values or modeling of professional val-
ues, while legitimate, do not stand at the center of higher education; in-
vestigation, discussion, critique, and judgment do. Of course, character 
development has been a traditional goal of colleges, as so many hours of 
community service affirm, and schools are free to incorporate religious 
and ethical values. But academic freedom exists to protect a liberal edu-
cation, which teaches students to think carefully and fruitfully for them-
selves, something antithetical to inculcation yo Schools whose "ultimate 
function" is to prepare students for employment do not merit any institu-
tional autonomy under the First Amendment. Doctrinally, the argument 
ignores the four freedoms, which do not extend to a university deciding 
for itself on academic grounds the employment policies of those who in-
terview on campus. Admission of a diverse student body rests on aca-
demic grounds because it shapes the nature of classroom discussion; ex-
cluding homophobic employers does not.91 
The brief seeks to anchor its claims about the scope of academic 
freedom by tying screening of potential employers to constitutionally 
89. AAUP Brief, supra note 87, at 12. 
90. On the nature ofa liberal education, see, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CULTIVATING 
HUMANITY 294--99 (1997). On the relation between academic freedom and liberal education, 
see Byrne, supra note 4, at 335-36. 
91. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (Powell, 1., concur-
ring and dissenting) (fmding a constitutional protection for university use of race in admissions 
decisions because "universities must be accorded the right to select those students who will 
contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas"'). Government rules excluding gays 
from military service, at most, will have only an attenuated effect on the exchange of ideas in 
law schools by discouraging a few gays from pursuing a legal education at all. It more likely 
has the opposite effect by perpetuating through statutes anachronistic legal taboos that call out 
for reform. 
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protected faculty autonomy over grading.92 The AAUP argues that just 
as a faculty may determine as a matter of educational policy to award 
grades based on students' merit, so it may determine that merit shall be 
the touchstone of a school's career development program. A faculty is 
entitled to make the academic judgment that assisting recruitment by an 
employer that refuses to hire openly gay students is akin to failing a stu-
dent in class merely for being gay.93 
The attractive core of this argument is that academic values do not 
recognize sexual orientation as a fair or relevant criterion for denying 
anyone an appointment or admission. But the argument applies these 
values to a context where they have no direct or substantial effect on 
teaching or scholarship-student employment services. In effect, this 
argument claims imperialistic autonomy for any university operations to 
which an academic norm can be analogized, even in a non-academic con-
text. Doctrinally, this runs counter to NCAA v. Board of Regents, where 
the Court made it clear that it would examine antitrust issues within col-
lege football with the same intensity as those it would within profes-
sional football, not withstanding university arguments about the educa-
tional values of amateurism.94 Several recent lower court cases aptly 
distinguish between protected decisions and those fully subject to regula-
tion.95 
More importantly, these limits must be recognized because universi-
ties carry on a plethora of socially useful activities that go far beyond 
scholarship and liberal education, from running radio stations to testing 
new drugs to advising farmers on what trees to plant. The government 
has legitimate interests in regulating most of these programs, which 
could be carried on as well in any number of institutions as in universi-
ties. Citizens will be perplexed why legislatures may not regulate activi-
ties they normally regulate, simply because universities carry them out. 
Public, including judicial, support for academic freedom will wane when 
citizens no longer can perceive how it functions to protect the important 
public interest in producing knowledge.96 
92. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 n.11 (1985). 
93. AAUP Brief, supra note 87, at 12. 
94. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
95. Compare George Washington Univ. v. District of Columbia, 318 F.3d 203 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (rejecting academic freedom challenge to zoning requirement to house a percentage of 
students on campus), and Tenn. Div. of the United Daughters of the Confederacy v. Vanderbilt 
Univ., 174 S.W.3d 98, 118-19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (academic freedom does not excuse uni-
versity from complying with terms of gift agreement naming dormitory "Confederate Memo-
rial Hall"), with Yacovelli v. Moeser, No. 1:02CV596, 2004 WL 1144183, at *14-16 
(M.D.N.C. May 20, 2004) (citing academic freedom as factor in rejecting Establishment 
Clause challenge to university's assignment of a book about Islam to first-year students). 
96. Derek Bok has warned about an analgous sapping of scholarly ideals and public sup-
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Similarly, exempting peripheral university functions from govern-
ment regulation will create an unwholesome incentive for school offi-
cials and entrepreneurs to use the university form as a vehicle to carry 
out new and additional economic activities. Universities already struggle 
to reconcile their intellectual missions with many schemes used to raise 
the funds to carry out that mission. Providing a new reason to do busi-
ness through a university would further bolster the economic interests of 
schools against core intellectual values. 
Stated positively, constitutional academic freedom protects the core 
intellectual missions of the university: research, scholarship, and liberal 
education. Although it primarily protects the institution from outside in-
terference and includes policies and administrative practices as well as 
speech, it does so to protect the professional academic freedom of its 
members. Academic speech, which is distinctively collective, whether 
within disciplines or in classrooms, is of utmost value to society because 
it constitutes a uniquely powerful method for seeking truth, both in actual 
practice and in equipping graduates better to practice that essential task. 
My fear is that claiming constitutional protection for other tasks per-
formed by universities will obscure this vital connection and weaken the 
moral appeal of academic freedom. 
CONCLUSION 
After Grutter, we urgently need to specify the nature and content of 
constitutional academic freedom. In this essay, I have reviewed a few 
contemporary controversies to conclude that academic freedom is a real 
constitutional right that a court should use to invalidate conflicting legis-
lation, that its essence involves the autonomy of academic institutions to 
maintain scholarly standards and processes without the outside intrusion 
of political tests or controls, and that it must be limited to those policies 
and practices essential to maintaining the professional academic freedom 
of its members. As such, constitutional academic freedom has a plausi-
ble and important role to play in First Amendment jurisprudence. 
port through creeping commercialization of universities. DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE 
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